




‘SHAME THEM AND MAKE THEM TOXIC’

THE LEFT’S CAMPAIGN TO ATTACK ITS POLITICAL OPPONENTS USING
LAWFARE AND BARFARE

SEPTEMBER 2026



Shame Them and Make Them Toxic'

The Left's ongoing campaign to use lawfare and barfare against its political opponents.

Dictionaries commonly define “lawfare” as “the strategic use of legal proceedings to intimidate or hinder an opponent.”¹ Successful lawfare, like modern warfare, depends on tactical and strategic goals, systematic planning, marshaled forces, logistics and supplies, delegated missions, and carefully choreographed attacks by different force components.

A consortium of left-wing special interest groups and individual agitators (“Lawfare Consortium”) has developed and repeatedly employed a highly effective lawfare doctrine against GOP-aligned lawyers over the last decade. The doctrine was used most notably during the 2022-23 campaign against attorneys who represented the Trump campaign and aligned clients while the president contested the 2020 election results. The approach had been tested years earlier and has remained a staple of these groups, gaining momentum during the president’s second term in office.

The attackers have run a well-funded, coordinated national campaign of legal, professional, and institutional actions against more than 100 lawyers in 26 states. The effort is designed to make an example of those who represent or work for President Trump, causing reputational pain while deterring prospective qualified appointees and attorneys from joining the administration.

Democracy Restored has reviewed public records, preserved source materials, nonprofit disclosures, disciplinary records, court documents, organizational publications, and internal analytical datasets to determine the campaign’s scope, targets, and funding. The analysis leads to an unavoidable conclusion: commonalities among actions taken over years, across dozens of jurisdictions, by the same set of related organizations undercut any argument that the targeting of more than 100 lawyers is anything other than a partisan smear campaign.

This is an indictment of the Lawfare Consortium as a whole, but it also leaves honest observers to view each individual matter through this lens, dramatically undermining the merit and objectivity professed by Consortium members.

Persecution Proof-of-Concept

Axios reported² in March 2022 that “a dark money group with ties to Democratic Party heavyweights will spend millions this year to expose and try to disbar more than 100 lawyers who worked on Donald Trump’s post-election lawsuits.”

¹ Collins Dictionary, “lawfare,” accessed September 23, 2026, <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/lawfare>.

² Lachlan Markay and Jonathan Swan, “Scoop: High-Powered Group Targets Trump Lawyers’ Livelihoods,” *Axios*, March 7, 2022, <https://www.axios.com/2022/03/07/trump-election-lawyers-disbar>.

That group was The 65 Project. Its organizational collaborators included Lawyers Defending American Democracy, States United Democracy Center, Democracy Forward Foundation, Democracy Defenders Fund, Campaign for Accountability, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW), and Global Impact. These organizations, along with their agitator architects and supportive donors, formed the Lawfare Consortium. The Consortium had a strategic plan that was not about seeing justice done and was not simply punitive. The Consortium was out to crush opponents and keep them off the field.

The 65 Project advisor David Brock, the Hillary Clinton insider and founder of Media Matters, told Axios the campaign would not merely file grievances against its targets; it would “shame them and make them toxic” in their communities and firms. He specifically mentioned the vulnerability of smaller practitioners. The effort would threaten their livelihoods and local reputations. Another participant described the objective as reducing the pool of right-leaning legal talent available for future election disputes.

Those post-2020 days offered a target-rich environment, which the campaign used effectively. We believe it could take large-scale action quickly because the concept had been test-driven in a 2017 attack on Kris Kobach, vice-chair of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity. Kobach was Kansas Secretary of State when President Trump tapped him; he was largely unknown outside Kansas at the time.

Kobach was already the subject of *Fish v. Kobach* before Trump’s inauguration, an ACLU lawsuit over “his conduct surrounding a dispute over the production of two documents” related to voting identification. The judge partly agreed with the plaintiffs and, citing Kobach’s “deceptive conduct and lack of candor,” fined him \$1,000 and forced him to submit to deposition by the plaintiffs.³

Kobach requested voter data from all fifty states on June 28, 2017, acting for the presidential commission. That request triggered an immediate national response⁴ from self-described voting-rights and government-accountability organizations, including a July 3 disciplinary complaint⁵ against him by Washburn University student and Democratic committeewoman Keri Strahler.

Strahler’s filing relied principally on the *Fish* sanction and other reported instances of noncompliance with court orders. She subsequently made the disciplinary office’s reply public, which is not standard procedure in such complaints.

³ Order, *Fish v. Kobach*, No. 2:16-cv-02105-JAR-JPO (D. Kan. June 23, 2017), ECF No. 355.

⁴ Brennan Center for Justice, “Responses to the ‘Voter Fraud’ Commission’s Voter File Data Request,” October 5, 2017, <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/responses-voter-fraud-commissions-voter-file-data-request>.

⁵ Roxana Hegeman, “Kansas Agency Investigates Kobach over Voting Allegations,” *KSL.com*, July 17, 2017, <https://www.ksl.com/article/45062922/kansas-agency-investigates-kobach-over-voting-allegations>.

Several organizations took separate legal or administrative actions involving Kobach or the commission on July 3, 2017:

- The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law filed a Hatch Act complaint⁶ against Kobach.
- The Electronic Privacy Information Center filed suit against the commission and Kobach⁷ concerning its voter-data collection.
- The Brennan Center and United to Protect Democracy submitted an OMB letter challenging the commission's data request⁸.

CREW filed a separate Justice Department complaint⁹ against Kobach in November 2017, alleging he had improperly written and been paid for a column for Breitbart News that he later used on the Commission's website.

Kansas attorney Matthew Hoppock filed a bar complaint¹⁰ in March 2018. He was not involved in the *Fish* case, but as a self-admitted opponent of Kobach's proof-of-citizenship policy, he had followed news reports, announced his intentions through tweets, and translated reported courtroom events into at least four alleged violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. Such filings are not normally the stuff of media campaigns, social or otherwise.

The upshot for the Lawfare Consortium was Kobach's October 2019 diversion agreement¹¹, which specifically related to Strahler's 2017 complaint and admitted two supervisory violations. The disciplinary administrator stated that the agreement resulted from her filing. The office made no finding of dishonest conduct and declined to say whether Hoppock's complaint had been investigated. The parties agreed to disclose Kobach's participation and admissions even though diversion normally remained confidential.

⁶ Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, "Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Files Hatch Act Complaint Against Kris Kobach," July 3, 2017, <https://www.lawyerscommittee.org/lawyers-committee-civil-rights-law-files-hatch-act-complaint-kris-kobach/>.

⁷ Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, "Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Files Hatch Act Complaint Against Kris Kobach," July 3, 2017, <https://www.lawyerscommittee.org/lawyers-committee-civil-rights-law-files-hatch-act-complaint-kris-kobach/>.

⁸ Liz Kennedy and Danielle Root, *Keeping Voters off the Rolls: Impact of Documentary Proof of Citizenship and Illegal Voter Purges*, Center for American Progress, July 18, 2017, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/keeping-voters-off-rolls/>.

⁹ Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, "CREW Sends Kobach Complaint to DOJ," November 28, 2017, <https://www.citizensforethics.org/legal-action/legal-complaints/crew-sends-kobach-complaint-doj/>.

¹⁰ Dan Margolies, "Kobach's Behavior During Recent Trial Prompts Ethics Complaint from Overland Park Lawyer," *KCUR*, March 28, 2018, <https://www.kcur.org/news/2018-03-28/kobachs-behavior-during-recent-trial-prompts-ethics-complaint-from-overland-park-lawyer>.

¹¹ Sherman Smith, "Kobach Enters Diversion Over Court Conduct," *The Topeka Capitol Journal*, October 28, 2019, <https://www.cjonline.com/story/news/politics/state/2019/10/28/kris-kobach-enters-diversion-over-conduct-in-voter-registration-case/2424424007>.

The full-court press against a hitherto nationally unknown official, including the July 3, 2017, flurry of activity, could be a coincidence. The targets and legal theories differed, covering attorney discipline, the Hatch Act, privacy law, administrative law, and federal records requirements, but collectively they placed Kobach under pressure in multiple forums immediately following his national appointment and voter-data request. The timing suggests less a pile-on than a trigger pulled on several weapons pointed in the same pre-determined direction.

Present evidence does not establish that Strahler participated in planning the other July 3 organizations' actions. It does show that her complaint belonged to a larger, tightly clustered wave of legal and reputational activity against the same official and policy project.

Strahler's and Hoppock's complaints were both generated from the public record of *Fish v. Kobach*; but neither complainant was counsel in the litigation. Each converted judicial criticism, procedural disputes, and adverse reporting into alleged professional-conduct violations. Hoppock is a lawyer, of course, but Strahler is not.

The *Fish* litigation functioned as a continuing source of disciplinary allegations regardless of whether Strahler and Hoppock communicated, and subsequent events followed a pattern that would become familiar after 2020:

Adverse judicial event → public reporting → outside complainant → ethics allegations → publicity → additional complaint following the next adverse development.

Hoppock's complaint did not merely duplicate Strahler's. It reads like a well-planned expansion of the theory from candor and compliance to competence, diligence, the advocate-witness rule, and alleged false statements.

Publicity's role in the Kobach events also foreshadowed the Consortium's post-2020 tactics. Kansas disciplinary proceedings generally remained confidential at the preliminary stage. Strahler nevertheless publicized the disciplinary office's response. Hoppock announced his intentions on Twitter and discussed the allegations with the press. The eventual diversion was disclosed by agreement. Strahler publicly demanded an acknowledgment of misconduct from Kobach, which is substantially what the diversion produced.

That combination is particularly relevant to the later lawfare thesis. The professional process was not used solely to obtain a confidential regulatory determination. It also generated reputational consequences, continuing press coverage, and a publicly available narrative about Kobach's fitness and conduct. The Kobach episode demonstrated nearly every functional element later institutionalized by attorney-accountability organizations. It also captured the zeitgeist of the left-wing legal world.

Legal scholarship¹² was already calling the broader practice of lawfare against the administration “ethics resistance” by 2019.

Another fact connects the Kobach affair with the later legal onslaught. Former Obama “Ethics Czar” Norm Eisen¹³ was chairman of CREW’s board when the group filed its Justice Department complaint. Eisen later became a founder and chair of the States United Democracy Center¹⁴, one of the seven special interest groups prominent in the post-2020 campaign and one of the primary attack vehicles in the Lawfare Consortium.

Scorched Earth Lawfare

The evidence suggests that when the post-election challenges of 2020 arrived, the Consortium’s components, non-profit organizations, strategic agitators, and large funders, were ready to unleash unprecedented scorched-earth lawfare to disarm President Trump specifically and Republicans more broadly in future elections. The Kobach case had provided a proven doctrine with which to criminalize lawyers who appeared to do their best to advise the parties that retained them but ultimately were guilty of representing the Consortium’s political opponents.

The targeting of John Eastman (disbarred), Cleta Mitchell (resigned from her law firm), Rudolph Giuliani (disbarred), Kenneth Chesebro (disbarred), and Jenna Ellis (suspended from the bar) unfolded similarly to the Kobach attack and drew national headlines. Each of those high-profile cases had a dozen other named targets. Hundreds of additional lawyers came to understand that they would be attacked, maligned, and perhaps disbarred if they agreed to represent the wrong party or candidate in a future disputed election. The Consortium, in a sense, wanted to be positioned to dare conservatives to contest an election.

The 65 Project and its collaborators were not making idle threats at launch, and Kobach was not merely a target of opportunity for like-minded activists. The special interest organizations were coordinating for the long game, seeking to place political opponents at a sustained disadvantage.

Strategic Coordination for Partisan Purposes

The 65 Project and its collaborators have never pretended to be a passive research effort or neutral clearinghouse for legal ethics information. The operation has always been a partisan-driven smear campaign. The 65 Project announced a plan to identify a national class of lawyers associated with election litigation, file disciplinary complaints


¹² Scott L. Cummings, “Lawyers in Backsliding Democracy,” *California Law Review* 112, no. 2 (2024): 513–624, <https://www.californialawreview.org/print/lawyers-in-backsliding-democracy>.

¹³ Brookings Institution, “Norman Eisen,” accessed August 22, 2026, <https://www.brookings.edu/people/norman-eisen/>.

¹⁴ Penn State University, “McCourtney Institute Names Recipients of 2022 Brown Democracy Medal,” March 21, 2022, <https://www.psu.edu/news/impact/story/mccourtney-institute-names-recipients-2022-brown-democracy-medal/>.

against them¹⁵, expose them publicly, press bar institutions to impose professional consequences, and deter other attorneys from taking similar work. Political and representational alignment defined the target population: lawyers who had represented the Trump campaign, advanced post-2020 election claims, participated in alternate-electoral activity, or otherwise supported challenges to the election process and results.

Lawfare Action by Activist Organization



This was a deliberate fusion of legal advocacy, electoral politics, opposition research, fundraising, and strategic communications. The 65 Project was staffed accordingly, largely by Clinton insiders with many years of experience.


The campaign functioned simultaneously across organizations, among solo agitators, and across disciplines: lawyers and professional ethics specialists could prepare complaints and proposed rule changes; political strategists could define the target universe and electoral relevance. Communications professionals could package accusations for press and digital distribution. Fundraising and nonprofit vehicles could provide continuity outside an election committee. The combined structure made each complaint more than a submission to a disciplinary authority: it became a communications asset, reputational event, warning to the target's peers, and reusable proof point for later fundraising and advocacy.

The geographic plan further shows sophisticated central direction. Ethics complaints targeted 15 current and former red state attorneys general. The 2022 launch covered 26 states, while a 2024 advertising campaign concentrated on Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, five states central to presidential election litigation. The ads were designed to reach current and prospective attorneys and conservative law

¹⁵ The 65 Project, "Ethics Complaints," accessed August 22, 2026, <https://the65project.com/ethics-complaints/>.

firms through TV, radio, social media, and state bar journals. The 65 Project boasted that the initial buy alone was six figures and promised additional waves. Selecting jurisdictions, audiences, media channels, and message timing at a national level reflects a coordinated political-legal operation, not spontaneous or independent professional action.

Lawfare Actions by State



States United Democracy Center¹⁶ and Lawyers Defending American Democracy¹⁷ (LDAD) repeatedly targeted the same cohort of attorneys as The 65 Project and, in several matters, acted in explicit collaboration. The organizations jointly filed the District of Columbia complaint against John Eastman; urged further discipline against Jenna Ellis after her Georgia plea; filed complaints against Kurt Olsen in Maryland and the District of Columbia; and submitted supplements in both jurisdictions.

Coordination among the attacking organizations allowed sustained pressure on a target across time, jurisdictions, and institutions. States United first filed against John Eastman in California, appealed the procedural closure of its complaint, supplied additional information, and later submitted congressional evidence to support the bar investigation. States United and LDAD then opened a second jurisdictional front in the District of Columbia with a complaint signed by 50 attorneys and former officials. The same target, substantially the same political episode, successive evidentiary packages, multiple licensing jurisdictions, and coordinated public releases formed one extended pressure campaign.

Public institutions were also central to the Consortium's campaign as it built formal interfaces with bar authorities and continuing government investigations. Our investigation identified six such interface records: supplemental submissions to the

¹⁶ States United Democracy Center, accessed August 22, 2026, <https://statesunited.org/>.

¹⁷ Lawyers Defending American Democracy, accessed August 22, 2026, <https://ldad.org/>.

California bar, a joint referral request to the January 6 Select Committee, congressional reports and referrals, a Texas disciplinary review, and federal litigation touching the District of Columbia disciplinary process. The campaign would then feed public-investigation material into professional-discipline channels and use resulting procedural developments for renewed public pressure. This rinse-wash-repeat strategy effectively fed media allies, raised ongoing funds, and amplified the disincentive that prospective or recruited attorneys would internalize.

Repeatable Tactics Increased Effectiveness but Exposed the Consortium's MO

The campaign used the same operational sequence against each target across organizations and jurisdictions throughout 2022 and 2023:

- Identify an attorney connected to the post-2020 Republican election effort.
- Translate public records, court filings, congressional material, or later criminal dispositions into alleged professional-conduct violations.
- Submit a complaint or supplemental referral to one or more licensing authorities.
- Publish the accusation through an organizational webpage or press release.
- Amplify the filing through allied voices and media coverage.
- Return to the matter when a hearing, charge, recommendation, plea, or decision creates another communications opportunity.

We can see this sequence in practice. States United filed its California complaint against John Eastman on October 4, 2021, and announced it the same day. The 65 Project filed its complaint against Kenneth Chesebro on July 20, 2022, and announced the action that day. States United and Lawyers Defending American Democracy jointly submitted a District of Columbia complaint against Eastman on August 11, 2022, and issued public materials around the filing. Our investigation's media chronology repeatedly pairs legal action with immediate or subsequent public communication, converting administrative filings into national political content.¹⁸

Coordination is even more visible when the campaign "batched" activities to manipulate public perception. The 65 Project produced a wave of complaints against 15 sitting or former Republican attorneys general on September 21, 2022. The campaign did not wait for organic complaints to accumulate. It selected one category from a precompiled list of wrongdoing, prepared a coordinated release using an almost identical letter to each state's bar, and presented the targets together as part of a single national accountability story. The batch model standardized both the allegation and public

¹⁸ States United Democracy Center, "Request for Investigation of John C. Eastman," October 4, 2021, <https://statesunited.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/10.4.21-FINAL-Eastman-Cover-Letter-Memorandum.pdf>; The 65 Project, "Ethics Complaint Against Kenneth Chesebro," July 20, 2022, <https://the65project.com/ethics-complaint-against-kenneth-chesebro/>; States United Democracy Center and Lawyers Defending American Democracy, "Complaint Concerning John Eastman," August 11, 2022, https://statesunited.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/08.11.22_States-United-LDAD_Complaint-to-DC-ODC-re-John-Eastman_Final.pdf

interpretation before any individual disciplinary authority could substantiate or dismiss the filings.

Publicity also created deliberate source echo bias. A complaint generated a campaign announcement; that announcement produced news coverage; the coverage became a cited indicator of controversy; later materials could then point to the accumulated buzz they had generated as proof that the targeted attorney was already professionally suspect. The original allegation therefore acquired reach and apparent corroboration through repetition across channels. The resulting source echo was an operational product of the campaign itself.

Funding Sources

A national campaign of this size required commensurate resources. The seven special interest organizations operating as key attacking vehicles in the Consortium together totaled \$183.2 million in annual revenue in 2025.

Most activity advanced by the Lawfare Consortium can be done through general support and full-time staff, yet evidence also shows lawfare-specific funding. Our investigation identified eight grants to States United totaling about \$15.78 million during tax years 2021 through 2024, including a \$1.657 million Hopewell Fund grant in 2022. Those funds supported an organization able to research complex legal records, prepare filings and supplements, coordinate signatories, maintain multi-year matters, communicate with the press, and operate across jurisdictions.

The funding's significance is operational durability: the work could continue long after the immediate 2020 election litigation ended. Most organizations' annual tax filings for 2025 have not yet been filed; however, continued funding has likely been dedicated to maintaining lawfare activities targeting influential and effective lawyers, along with other political operatives, associated with President Trump's second presidential administration.

The 65 Project likewise moved through established nonprofit and advocacy infrastructure. The public record shows that, at launch, it was associated with LawWorks and the Franklin Education Forum¹⁹, an organization historically connected to Brock and other national political-communications figures. The Project's current presentation is integrated into the Legal Accountability Center²⁰, which accepts contributions as a 501(c)(4) and describes The 65 Project as one component of a broader offensive legal strategy. Institutional names evolved, but the mission, leadership, tactics, and target category remained continuous.

¹⁹ InfluenceWatch, "Franklin Education Forum," accessed August 22, 2026, <https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/franklin-education-forum/>.

²⁰ InfluenceWatch, "Legal Accountability Center," accessed August 22, 2026, <https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/legal-accountability-center/>.

That continuity matters because the campaign was designed for more than retrospective punishment. Its websites and advertisements repeatedly look forward: future elections, prospective lawyers, revised professional rules, and continuing pressure on institutions. Funding vehicles, staffed organizations, public complaint archives, communications contractors, and partner networks transformed a post-election reaction into standing infrastructure that can be restarted at any time.

Has it Worked?

The Legal Accountability Center describes The 65 Project as “insurance” protecting electoral victories and credits the campaign with altering Republican lawyers’ actions.²¹ Its broader program says it uses bar complaints to create deterrence, imposes costs to change institutional risk calculations, and seeks a cycle in which legal consequences compound. That is a campaign theory of victory in operational terms: complaints trigger investigations; investigations generate publicity and cost; that exposure and expense discourage representation; fewer available lawyers reduce the opposing side’s future legal capacity.

The campaign’s strategic target, therefore, was not limited to lawyers already named. It was also the next attorney asked to represent a Republican candidate, election official, or presidential administration. The effort made examples of its first targets so that fewer and less effective lawyers would be available later. The 2024 ads reinforced that logic explicitly by targeting current and potential attorneys and conservative law firms with warnings about loss of licensure.


Our investigation recorded nine deterrence profiles covering disbarments, suspensions, firm departures, a university departure, reported employment loss, and lawyers declining to represent conservative clients. John Eastman, Cleta Mitchell, Rudolph Giuliani, Kenneth Chesebro, and Jenna Ellis were the big names. Others included Stefan Passantino, Paul MacNeal Davis, William Bradley Carver, and unnamed Florida attorneys reportedly unwilling to join Trump’s defense team. The collective signal was larger than any individual outcome: association could trigger simultaneous legal, employment, reputational, and media exposure for lawyers and institutions.

The system therefore imposed costs at multiple points. A lawyer could face a complaint in more than one jurisdiction, repeated supplemental filings, public accusation before adjudication, news coverage generated by complainants, pressure on an employer or institution, future bar-admission complications, and targeted advertising aimed at peers and clients. A disciplinary authority could decline to impose a final sanction, yet the campaign still achieved exposure, defense burden, and reputational risk. That is why organizers emphasized smaller practitioners: professional vulnerability made deterrence possible before formal discipline was complete. The campaign has clearly met many or most of its goals.

²¹ Legal Accountability Center, “The 65 Project,” accessed September 23, 2026, <https://legalaccountability.org/work/65-project>.

Forever Lawfare

A lawfare doctrine this sophisticated and lucrative as a fundraising vehicle is not something to shelve when the campaign is through with its original targets. Members of the second Trump administration have been attacked according to its precepts. The Consortium filed 19 complaints in 2025 and 22 thus far in 2026. Pam Bondi, Boris Epshteyn, Todd Blanche, Jeanine Pirro, and others in the current administration have been targeted. Some accounts say dozens of other victims are being scoped out for similar treatment.



The campaign remains a coordinated effort to use professional-discipline mechanisms and public pressure against attorneys seeking to support the America First agenda, with the stated purpose of making representation personally costly and strategically scarce. Our investigation found patterns that indicate coordination through a common objective, political staffing, shared targets, repeatable tactics, synchronized timing, institutional partnerships, funding capacity, and the campaign's own definition of success.

The lawfare campaign has not only been effective and ongoing into Trump 47, its goals have at times expanded to fit the needs of the Consortium. For instance, efforts to call out political weaponization by the Consortium and recompense its victims have been met with subsequent bar complaints against the responsible legal officers representing the U.S. Government.

This played out in the wake of the USG's settlement of *Trump v. IRS*, where senior government attorneys (including the sitting Attorney General and the Associate Attorney General) were targeted for bar complaints by Consortium members LDAD and Campaign for Accountability. Of course, it is not surprising that it would be critical to the

Consortium's long-term lawfare campaign to prevent victims from being made whole and given the opportunity to expose their victimhood. This case shows the Consortium will remain very diligent in protecting its thin façade of credibility and objectivity.

Lawfare, again, is “the strategic use of legal proceedings to intimidate or hinder an opponent.” The Consortium's campaign has certainly hindered the work of America First lawyers over the past decade. It has damaged reputations and ended careers. A generation of right-leaning attorneys has become reluctant to serve their country or use their talents to advance causes in which they believe. Mission accomplished.

The campaign's effectiveness, however, only casts doubt on the merits of the individual cases that comprise it. Few complaints would have been made by anyone interested in justice or ethical standards; anyone so interested would not list “shame them and make them toxic” among the campaign's goals. Those that were filed would not be publicized and would maintain their typical confidentiality. Lawyers do sometimes misstep, run afoul of ethical rules, and receive rebukes from judges; some actions can be serious enough to warrant disbarment. Hundreds of coordinated actions against more than 100 lawyers, whose commonality is affiliation with one political party, represent partisans pursuing a competitive advantage.

Carl von Clausewitz believed “War is the continuation of politics by another name.” For the Consortium, so is law.

